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LABOR LAW-SAFETY
DISPUTES-WALKOUTS UNDER SECTION 502
OF THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT
The attainment of safe working conditions has plagued work-
ers, employers, and governments since the Industrial Revolution
began. Attempts to solve the problem have met with varying de-
grees of success. As workers and their representatives have become
increasingly vocal in their concern for safety improvements on the
job, attempts to remedy hazards have become more ambitious. For
example, two major pieces of federal safety legislation, the Federal
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act' and the Occupational Safety
and Health Act,2 have been enacted within the past few years. It
has been estimated that OSHA alone applies to approximately 4.1
million businesses and 57 million employees. 3
Aside from the health of employees affected, labor-
management disputes often involve safety conditions. Such dis-
putes generally concern the existence of safety hazards and the
rights of interested parties once hazards are recognized. These dis-
putes will likely increase in some rough correlation to the height-
ened safety-consciousness of workers and new legislation providing
minimum safety standards.4
One federal statute which will frequently be invoked by work-
ers in future safety disputes is section 502 of the Taft-Hartley Act
of 1947. It extends job protection for those who refuse to work
under hazardous conditions. The applicable part of the statute
provides that "the quitting of labor by an employee or employees
in good faith because of abnormally dangerous conditions for work
at the place of employment of such employee or employees [shall
not] be deemed a strike under this chapter."6 Employees can,
'30 U.S.C. §§ 801-960 (1971).
229 U.S.C. §§ 651-76 (1971).
Spann, The New Occupational Safety and Health Act, 58 A.B.A.J. 255 (1972).
'The United Mine Workers has announced that it is taking a "new tough
posture" to force safety consciousness upon coal companies. Charleston Gazette,
Aug. 23, 1973, § A, at 3, col. 1. Given the prevalence of coal mining in West
Virginia, it is reasonable to expect that many safety disputes will occur within this
State.
529 U.S.C. § 143 (1971).
'Id. The first portion of the statute provides that the Taft-Hartley Act shall
not be construed to compel employees to perform labor. Section 502 has been
characterized as representing congressional deference to the thirteenth amendment
to the United States Constitution which protects citizens from involuntary servi-
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therefore, refuse to work under abnormally dangerous conditions
without the threat of replacement and other economic reprisals.
Therefore, section 502 is a practical tool labor organizations can
use to assure their members will not be inhibited by fear of losing
their jobs if they refuse to work in dangerous surroundings.
Until recently, section 502 had received little attention. This
is understandable as the Taft-Hartley Act is not a safety code and
safety-related employee walkouts have only recently become prev-
alent. Yet, with the burgeoning development in safety law noted
earlier, there is a need for labor organizations, employers, and
labor lawyers to become better acquainted with the traditional
application of section 502 by the National Labor Relations Board
and the federal courts, and with the limitations of the section.
Furthermore, since the vast majority of labor disputes are settled
long before any judicial intervention, there is a need for all con-
cerned with labor relations to weigh the value of relying upon
judicial interpretation of section 502 against the value of seeking
job protection for employees who refuse to work under alleged ab-
normally dangerous conditions through contractual arbitration.
I. HISTORY AND CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 502
Section 502 came into existence with one marked disadvan-
tage for the courts and the NLRB: it had no recorded legislative
history.! Possibly, courts were reluctant to construe the statute
since Congress failed to provide an interpretive aid. In any event,
the federal courts apparently overlooked section 502 in two cases
decided in the early 1950's that involved work stoppages allegedly
caused by hazardous working conditions! Instead, these cases
turned on whether the conduct of employees who stopped working
was concerted activity protected by section seven of the National
Labor Relations Act.9
tude. BuREAu OF NATIONAL AFFAms, TiE NEw LABOR LAw (1947).
7Knight Morley Corp., 116 N.L.R.B. 140, 146 (1956).
'NLRB v. Kohler Co., 220 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1955); NLRB v. American Manufac-
turing Co., 203 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1953).
'29 U.S.C. § 157 (1971) provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and
shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except
to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
[Vol. 76
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One of these decisions, NLRB v. Kohler Co.,"' involved a work
stoppage arguably protected by section 502. A group of employees
worked in a paint shop located near a furnace room. They walked
off the job when the employer shut down a blower system that
cooled the shop and removed harmful enamel dust from the air.
Instead of flatly refusing to work under these conditions, the em-
ployees reported for each shift and then left the working area to
see the company physician. When some of the employees refused
to return and complete their shift, they were discharged. The cir-
cuit court of appeals agreed with the NLRB, and held the em-
ployee action to be illegal, intermittent work stoppages."
An interesting comparison to Kohler is found in NLRB v.
Knight Morley Corp., ,2 which was decided only two years later.
The NLRB interpreted and applied section 502 for the first time
in Knight Morley."' As in Kohler, the alleged hazardous condition
was a defective blower system. Unlike Kohler, the employees in
Knight Morley refused even to report for their respective shifts,
thus foreclosing the possibility that their action would be found to
constitute intermittent work stoppages. After the employees had
been discharged, their union filed an unfair labor practice charge
against the employer with the NLRB. The trial examiner found
that section 502 protected the employees in their refusal to work.
The NLRB agreed, holding that the testimony demonstrated a
work setting that constituted an abnormally dangerous condition
under section 502.11 The fact that the collective bargaining agree-
ment contained a no-strike clause could not remove the protected
status of the discharged employees. The Board stated its belief
that Congress drafted section 502 to give workers a protected status
for such a walkout without regard to strike limitations, including
no-strike clauses.'5 The circuit court of appeals upheld the deci-
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as
authorized in section 158 (a) (3) of this title.
20220 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1955). The NLRB decision is reported at 108 N.L.R.B.
207 (1954).
"In NLRB v. American Manufacturing Co., 203 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1953), the
other early case in which'section 502 was ignored, the court decided that the em-
ployees were lawfully discharged because they walked out before the management
representative had a chance to investigate the matter. The walkout also violated
safety provisions included in the contract to which labor and management had
agreed on the day of the walkout.
12251 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1957).
13Knight Morley Corp., 116 N.L.R.B. 140, 146 (1956).
"Id. at 144.
"Id. at 146.
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sion. 11
Two important evidentiary rules were established in Knight
Morley. Workers in the alleged abnormally dangerous area were
held competent to testify to the actual conditions present when the
incident occurred.' 7 In addition, expert witnesses, such as in-
dustrial health experts, were permitted to testify as to whether
such conditions were abnormally dangerous.18
By 1961, the NLRB had explicitly prescribed the proof neces-
sary to prevail in proceedings involving section 502.11 Objective
criteria must be met to establish the existence of an abnormally
dangerous condition. The existence of the condition can be estab-
lished by competent evidence and testimony in accordance with
the evidentiary rules approved in Knight Morley.20 The Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals also adopted this standard of proof in
NLRB v. Fruin-Colnon Construction Co.2 The court held that a
"NLRB v. Knight Morley Corp., 251 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1957).
17The employees' testimony concerned their allegation that the blower intended
to cool them and to remove dust from the air was actually running in reverse. They
also testified as to the temperature in the work area. 116 N.L.R.B. at 143.
' The industrial health expert testified that the conditions in the work area
created a danger of heat disease which could result in death. Id. at 143-44.
"Redwing Carriers, Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. 1208 (1961). This case might have pre-
sented a real challenge to the Board: Can employees who are required to cross
another union's picket line as part of their employment claim the picketing workers
to be an abornmally dangerous condition? In Redwing, the employees were truck
drivers, and they claimed to have been threatened and jostled by another em-
ployer's workers who were on a picket line. They refused to attempt to cross the
line again and were fired by their employer. The Board did not have to decide
whether angry picketers could constitute an abnormally dangerous condition in any
situation, since there was evidence in this case that fifty of the respondent's other
truck drivers successfully crossed the picket line. Therefore, there could be no
finding of an abnormally dangerous condition. Id. at 1211.
-'Id. at 1210.
2'330 F.2d 885 (8th Cir. 1964). This decision is important to anyone contemplat-
ing the presentation of a case based on section 502. While interpreting section 502
in a manner consistent with other pertinent cases, the court reversed the Board and
held that the finding of an abnormally dangerous condition was based on insubstan-
tial evidence on the record as a whole. Among other considerations noted by the
court, only four out of the five employees involved walked off the job site. The fifth
employee testified that he did not consider the working conditions any more danger-
ous than those normally encountered as part of the job. Furthermore, the type of
work was classified as extremely dangerous under optimum conditions. For working
conditions to be abnormally dangerous, the degree of danger must be above the
normal, inherent dangers of the particular occupation. The court also felt the Sixth
Circuit had given an unwarranted construction to section 502 in NLRB v. Knight
Morley Corp., 251 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1957). One sentence in Knight Morley
[Vol. 76
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good faith belief in the existence of an abnormally dangerous con-
dition is not alone sufficient to afford workers protection under
section 502. To afford section 502 protection, an abnormally dan-
gerous condition must actually exist. In reviewing the findings of
the Board as to the existence of such a condition, the circuit courts
of appeals will determine only if the Board's findings are supported
by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole. This
is the same test generally used to review federal administrative
proceedings.2
In Curtis Mathes Manufacturing Co.,2 the Board appeared to
turn its objective test into a two step procedure without explicitly
labeling it as such. In addition to requiring proof by objective
evidence that an abnormally dangerous condition existed, the
Board required proof that the employees' good faith belief in the
existence of an abnormally dangerous condition had a reasonable
basis. In Curtis Mathes, the question of whether an abnormally
dangerous condition actually existed was never reached. The
Board found no reasonable basis for a good faith belief, since there
was evidence that the same condition had occurred previously
without a walkout. Furthermore, when the dismissed employees
left the job site, they constituted only a small group of the workers.
The workers in the most dust laden area remained on the job.24 But
this evidence goes more readily to the issue of the existence of the
abnormally dangerous condition than it does to demonstrate the
lack of a reasonable basis for a good faith belief in a dangerous
condition. The fact that one or more fellow workers did not quit
work runs contrary to the allegation that working conditions were
dangerous. 5 The issue of whether the employees had a good faith
belief is integral in those cases where the possibility of another
motive for the walkout is presented. For example, if the employees
indicates that there need only be a finding that employees walked out due to a good
faith belief in the existence of an abnormally dangerous condition. However, this
reference is probably a result of oversight rather than intention by the Sixth Circuit
as that court subsequently affirmed a Board order based on the conclusion that the
existence of an abnormally dangerous condition had been proved by objective evi-
dence. 330 F.2d at 892. '
2'Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1950).
n145 N.L.R.B. 473 (1963).
271d. at 475 n.4.
nNevertheless, Curtis Mathes was later cited by the Board for the proposition
that working conditions must be shown by competent evidence to be reasonably
considered abnormally dangerous. Stop and Shop, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 75, 76 n,3
(1966).
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discharged in Curtis Mathes had had a dispute with management
unrelated to the safety question shortly before the walkout, the
issue of a good faith belief might come into play.
Recently, two circuits have rendered decisions that not only
contain widely divergent treatments of section 502, but also raise
fundamental issues concerning the best method for settling safety
disputes. Both cases began when injunctions were sought against
walkouts triggered by safety disputes. These cases were instituted
by employers under section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act,2" which
permits suits for violations of labor contracts to be brought by the
employer or the employees in federal courts.
In Hanna Mining Co. v. United Steelworkers,1 the labor con-
tract between the employer and the union had an accelerated pro-
cedure for settling safety disputes that bypassed the normal griev-
ance steps and compelled immediate arbitration. However, this
dispute never reached arbitration. By the contract, employees who
refused to work because of an unsafe condition were to initiate the
machinery for settling a safety dispute by filing a grievance with
the employer. The employer in this case violated the clause by
firing the employees before they were able to file their grievances.
When workers in other parts of the plant learned of the dismissals,
all union employees in the facility walked off their jobs. The em-
ployer sought an injunction in federal district court against this
second walkout, claiming a violation of the contract's no-strike
clause. The injunction was denied on two bases: (1) The employer
had not shown that he was entitled to equitable relief; and (2) in
spite of the contract provisions, the union was not required to
arbitrate grievances involving safety. 8
The decision was reversed upon appeal. The court held that
the very specific labor contract provision for settling safety dis-
putes required arbitration of such grievances.21 On the other hand,
the court noted the employer's violation of the contract and or-
2129 U.S.C. § 185 (1971).
2 464 F.2d 565 (8th Cir. 1972). The safety incident concerned the dismissal of
employees who refused to change grates on a conveyor belt that was continuously
moving. The employer had added feeder rollers to the conveyor belt shortly before
the incident took place, and the addition of the rollers sharply increased the speed
of the belt. The employees believed it too dangerous to attempt changing grates
while the belt was moving so rapidly.
21Id. at 567.
*'Id. at 568.
[Vol. 76
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dered the reinstatement of all employees without penalty., At the
appellate level, the employees argued that their action in refusing
to work was protected by section 502. Following previous interpre-
tations of section 502, the court denied this defense. The defense
had not been raised at the trial court level, and there had been no
proof that an abnormally dangerous condition existed. In addition,
there had been no finding that the employees actually quit their
labor in a good faith belief that an abnormally dangerous condition
existed. Such a finding is, of course, necessary before section 502
can be brought into play.'
The second case, Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers,"
contained a factual setting less amenable to the application of
section 502 than Hanna Mining Co. Yet, the court denied an in-
junction against the employees involved, basing its decision on
section 502 and a general theory that arbitration of safety disputes
should be avoided whenever possible. In Gateway, a large group of
union employees voted not to work under assistant mine foremen
who had falsified mine safety records. The foremen were sus-
pended by their employer who later decided to reinstate them. The
union then began a work stoppage. Attempts to reach arbitration
proved futile, and the employer sought an injunction in federal
district court against the union to order binding arbitration of the
issue.33 A preliminary injunction was awarded and binding arbitra-
tion ordered with the condition that the employer suspend the
foremen until the arbitrator reached his decision." The union ap-
pealed to the Third Circuit, but, in the meantime, the arbitrator
found the issue arbitrable. He determined that there was no merit
in the miners' contention that the presence of the foremen in the
mine was abnormally dangerous. The foremen were allowed to
return to work .3 The case was reversed upon appeal, and the in-
"Id. at 568-70.
"Id. at 567-68. The court made no mention of whether the actual existence of
the alleged abnormally dangerous condition needs to be determined at the trial
level.
3'466 F.2d 1157 (3rd Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 410 U.S. 953 (1973).
"Id. at 1158-59.
'Id. at 1158.
' The incident began when it was found that the air flow in one area of a coal
mine had been sharply reduced by the partial blockage of an intake airway. This
problem was quickly remedied. Federal and state mine inspectors came to the mine
to insure that repairs had been completed, and it was then discovered that the
assistant foremen had falsified air intake measurements on the previous shift. After
the foremen were suspended, the Pennsylvania Department of Mines notified the
7
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junction was vacated2
The applicability of three important facets of section 502 to
the facts of this case is questionable. First, what was the abnor-
mally dangerous condition? The majority implicitly accepted the
proposition that the word "condition" included in its meaning the
idea of two negligent foremen in a mine. The court stated that the
subject of safety disputes should not be limited to physical condi-
tions.37
Negligence is a valid subject of local safety disputes. Employ-
ees are free to protest to their employer that an employer repre-
sentative or another worker is negligent in safety matters. Such
complaints may be based on subjective reasons and even unsub-
stantiated opinions. Negligence, however, is not an appropriate
justification for a walkout under section 502. Proof before a court
of law or the NLRB that a human being is a continuing source of
an abnormally dangerous condition does not readily lend itself to
the objective test required by section 502. The negligence involved
in Gateway could be termed willful or wanton. But safety hazards
that are precipitated by human conduct appear more often to be
traceable to fellow workers or supervisors who are accident prone
or simply careless. If a hazardous act committed by such a person
were corrected, and if he were reprimanded or given a remedial
safety lecture, employees would be hard put to find a body that
would sanction a walkout conditioned on the person's dismissal or
transfer. The decision to reassign or discipline an employee for
lapses in safety consciousness should be jointly made by the em-
ployer and the labor organization with advice by state and federal
safety officials carrying great weight in the decision.
The next facet of section 502 to be considered is the basic
requirement that an abnormally dangerous condition must be es-
tablished as a basis for relief, or as a defense at the trial court level,
by competent, objective evidence and testimony. There is no indi-
cation that the union in Gateway raised section 502 in the trial
court as a defense against the injunction. In Hanna Mining Co.,"
the appellate court refused to vacate the injunction granted in the
trial court precisely because the employees had not offered section
employer that there were no objections to reinstating them. Subsequently, the
foremen pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of criminal violation of safety require-
ments, and they were fined. Id. at 1157.
"'Id. at 1161.
Id. at 1160-61.
464 F.2d 565 (1972).
[Vol. 76
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502 as a defense for their walkout. In Gateway, the court only
stated that there was no finding the employees did not honestly
believe their lives were in danger while the assistant foremen were
working underground. 39 Thus, it appears the court excused the
employees from their burden of proof.
*Finally, who is permitted to walk off the job when a safety
hazard is encountered and claim that such action is not a strike
but is protected by section 502? This question has not been directly
answered in the litigation of section 502. But, if it is agreed that
the purpose of this section is to protect the employees' health,
safety, and lives without fear of economic or job reprisals, 0 only
those workers threatened by the condition should be permitted to
walk off the job. In Gateway, all employees, including surface
workers, initially left their jobs .4
The majority in Gateway decided that the labor contract be-
tween the employer and the union did not explicitly require bind-
ing arbitration of safety disputes.4 2 With this finding established,
the court reasoned that since walkouts under section 502 cannot
be deemed strikes in violation of contractual no-strike clauses,
courts should avoid interpreting labor contracts to require arbitra-
tion of safety disputes whenever possible. The court stated that no-
strike clauses and arbitration requirements were "opposite sides of
a single coin.""
This theory raises important problems for the settlement of
safety disputes in general and section 502 disputes in particular.
If courts avoid construing labor contracts to require compulsory
arbitration of safety disputes, how are they to be settled? The
federal courts have not designed a national policy with respect to
settling safety disputes, but the general policy of settling labor
disputes has been to favor arbitration.44 In addition, the settlement
of section 502 disputes has been restricted to two methods. Section
502 can be the subject of an unfair labor practice charge before the
11466 F.2d at 1159.
'Knight Morley Corp., 116 N.L.R.B. 140, 146 (1956).
"466 F.2d at 1161 (dissenting opinion).
12466 F.2d at 1159. It is on this finding that the court in Hanna distinguished
that case from Gateway. 464 F.2d at 567-68 n.2. but the difference is at most one
of degree. The labor contract in Hanna contained a contract clause requiring arbi-
tration of safety disputes. The contract in Gateway required arbitration for all local
and district disputes.
21466 F.2d at 1160.
"United Steelworkers v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
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NLRB, or it can be litigated in the federal courts on the theory of
breach of the labor contract under section 301. 1
II. SErrTING SECTION 502 DISPUTES
Two important aspects of section 502 should be kept in mind.
Not all safety disputes that develop at the job site require consider-
ation of this section. An abnormally dangerous condition suggests
an immediate and serious hazard to life and limb that is beyond
the normal hazards encountered in the particular employment."
Although anticipation of a major catastrophe probably is not re-
quired, many of the daily lapses in safety consciousness that occur
in American industries would not be considered abnormally dan-
gerous.
Also, section 502 is not the "blank check" given to workers
that it might appear to be. For example, if a given number of
employees believe they are working in proximity to an abnormally
dangerous condition and walk off the job, the employer might disa-
gree with their belief and dismiss them. Should the remainder of
workers at the facility then walk out in protest, and all fail to prove
the existence of the abnormally dangerous condition, the employ-
ees who claimed to have been protected by section 502 are properly
dismissed, and the workers who walked out in protest are not un-
fair labor practice strikers and are subject to replacement."
'129 U.S.C. § 185 (1971).
"For example, underground coal mining would have to be classified as one of
the more dangerous occupations remaining in the United States. In section 502
disputes, courts have noted if the occupation involved was more dangerous than
most others. In NLRB v. Fruin-Colnon Construction Co., 330 F.2d 885 (8th Cir.
1964), the Eighth Circuit recognized that the work was "hazardous even under
optimum conditions," and noted that the employer considered the work to be
"dangerous per se" owing to the inherent and uncontrollable perils involved. How-
ever, the circuit court of appeals refused to enforce an order of the NLRB which
was predicated upon a finding of an abnormally dangerous condition. To support
its decision, the court noted the many safety precautions taken by the employer to
protect the workers.
The impression is made that it is.more difficult to establish an abnormally
dangerous condition in an occupation regarded as very dangerous, But the degree
of danger normally encountered in any given occupation should not be used to
determine whether a walkout is protected by section 502. Abnormally dangerous
conditions can occur in practically all occupations. In fact, workers used to laboring
in more dangerous occupations may be less likely than workers in safer jobs to
misinterpret a situation as abnormally dangerous.
"See NLRB v. Knight Morley Corp., 251 F.2d 753, 760 (6th Cir. 1957). See also
NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938) which initiated the
principle that an employer may replace economic strikers.
[Vol. 76
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Both the employer and his employees are gambling whenever
a section 502 problem is taken before the NLRB or a court. If
judicial sanction is given to the walkout, the employer can be faced
with a lengthy delay in production. If the protection of section 502
is denied, the employees involved are in danger of losing their
employment. Therefore, the interests of both parties as well as the
overriding federal desire for stability in labor relations weigh in
favor of arbitration, thereby minimizing gambling and emphasiz-
ing instead speedy adjustment and reconciliation. Under the
theory embraced in Gateway, the only alternative for an employer
who disputes the existence of an abnormally dangerous condition
and desires to have the issue conclusively settled will be to dis-
charge the employees concerned with the expectation they will file
an unfair labor practice charge.
The majority opinion in Gateway conveys the misleading im-
pression that the arbitration of safety disputes is a rare and unpo-
pular practice in American industry. The practice might not be
prevalent in the coal industry, but other industrial concerns in-
volving serious daily work hazards have been arbitrating safety
disputes at least since 1950.48 It is noteworthy that arbitrators re-
quire a presentation of facts and satisfaction of burdens of proof
in a manner strikingly similar to the trial requirements established
by the NLRB and the federal courts in section 502 disputes. 9 With
this in mind, it is difficult to believe that the safety of employees
or the present "power" balance between labor and management
will be sacrificed in the arbitration process.
Only one justification has been offered for excepting safety
disputes from the federal policy favoring arbitration: decisions af-
fecting the lives and safety of employees should not ultimately rest
in the hands of arbitrators. According to the majority opinion in
"Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 14 Lab. Arb. 552 (1950).
'"Bethlehem Steel Corp., 54 Lab. Arb. 503 (1970) (employees proved the exist-
ence of an unsafe condition beyond normal hazards of the work involved); Carmet
Co., 52 Lab. Arb. 790 (1969) (discharge of union men who led a walkout over an
allegedly hazardous condition held valid since no dangerous condition existed);
A.G. Suitor Construction Co., 52 Lab. Arb. 599 (1969) (walkout over hazardous
working conditions held justified despite a contractual no-strike clause); Allied
Chemical & Dye Corp., 31 Lab. Arb. 699 (1958) (chemical worker who left job site
because of the alleged presence of ammonia gas held to have been properly dis-
missed when facts showed, among other things, that other employees continued to
work on the job site without observing the presence of the gas); Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 14 Lab. Arb. 552 (1950) (employees held to have burden of showing
that a safety hazard actually existed).
11
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Gateway, "The arbitrator is not staking his life on his impartial
decision. It should not be the policy of the law to force the employ-
ees to stake theirs on his judgment."5 But from the first decision
involving section 502, it was evident that the courts would not
allow employees alone to decide when they could refuse to work
due to a safety hazard. The courts began to make impartial deci-
sions affecting the lives and safety of industrial workers when the
objective requirements necessary to satisfy section 502 were intro-
duced. Under statutes such as the Federal Coal Mine Health and
Safety Act and the Occupation Safety and Health Act, federal
inspectors are charged with the duty to make impartial decisions
pertaining to the existence of imminent danger on job sites.' The
inspector, too, is making decisions that affect the lives and safety
of workers. Whether the third party settling a safety dispute is an
arbitrator, a federal official, or a court, that party must dispatch
his responsibilities with the knowledge of all potential conse-
quences. There is'no reason to believe that an arbitrator, who is in
continuous contact with employees and their labor organizations,
is less sensitive to the importance of his work than any other person
charged with similar responsibilities.
At least two types of contract clauses have been drafted that
can promote fair settlements of safety disputes by negotiation and
arbitration while minimizing the possibility of hasty or faulty deci-
sions that might sacrifice employee safety. The first of these" al-
lows the initial decision as to the existence of an abnormally dan-
gerous condition to be made by representatives from both the labor
group and the employer. If an employee believes that such a condi-
tion exists, he can notify his foreman and walk off the job. If there
is no doubt of the existence of the condition, the employee cannot
"466 F.2d at 1160.
"The pertinent section in the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act is 30
U.S.C. § 814(a) (1971). It reads:
If, upon any inspection of a coal mine, an authorized representative of
the Secretary finds that an imminent danger exists, such representative
shall determine the area throughout which such danger exists, and there-
upon shall issue forthwith an order requiring the operator of the mine or
his agent to cause immediately all persons except those referred to in
subsection (d) of this section, to be withdrawn from, and to be prohibited
from entering such area until an authorized representative of the Secre-
tary determines that such imminent danger no longer exists.
The pertinent section of the Occupational Safety and Health Act is of similar
import. 29 U.S.C. § 657(f)(1) (1971).
"The elements of this clause can be found in Hanna Mining Co. v. United
Steelworkers of America, 464 F.2d 565, 566 (8th Cir. 1972).
[Vol. 76
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be reassigned to his prior task until the condition is remedied.
Should the existence of the alleged condition be challenged, a
management representative and the chairman of the union's griev-
ance committee must inspect the condition and decide whether the
employee was correct. If the union's representative finds an abnor-
mally dangerous condition, and the management representative
disagrees, the employee has the right to immediate reassignment
to another task on the job site by filing a grievance. The dispute
over the existence of the abnormally dangerous condition is imme-
diately submitted to an arbitrator.
The National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1971 pro-
vides a more intricate method of settling safety disputes.5 3 A Mine
Health and Safety Committee, comprised solely of qualified em-
ployees picked by the local union, can inspect any portion of the
job site. If they believe an imminently dangerous condition is pres-
ent and recommend the removal of employees from that area, the
employer must comply.54 Presumably, if an employee feels that a
condition is imminently dangerous, he can request inspection be-
fore continuing to work in that area of the mine. If a dispute then
arises over the safety matter, the contract contains a four-step
settlement procedure. A six member Joint Industry Health and
Safety Committee, composed equally of persons appointed by
labor and management, receives final power to settle the dispute
if it is not resolved in one of the three lower steps.5 This committee
elects a neutral chairman, and decisions by the committee are
binding on all parties. 56
These two contract clauses are only illustrative of the protec-
tion available at the local level to shield the worker from dangerous
working conditions and from the threat of economic reprisals. The
clauses also illustrate that questions and disputes concerning
'National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1971, art. III, §§ (g), (h). The
court in Gateway held that the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1968
did not reqlre arbitration of safety disputes. The 1971 agreement contains a sepa-
rate section on settlement of health or safety disputes which has a procedure that
parallels arbitration. Id. § (h).
11d. § (g)(1).
55d. §§ h(1), (2), (3). The first three steps require an attempted settlement
respectively by: (1) the mine management and the mine health and safety commit-
tee; (2) the U.M.W. district safety coordinator and a representative of the em-
ployer; and if they fail to agree, a representative from the U.S. Bureau of Mines or
an appropriate state agency must be consulted; and (3) the U.M.W. safety director
and a representative of the employer.
"Id. § (h)(4).
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safety are being answered and settled every day at the local level
in a scheme involving management, labor organizations, safety
officials, and arbitrators. Wide acceptance of these extra-judicial
methods of settling safety disputes involving abnormally danger-
ous conditions is essential to prevent employers from being forced
to dismiss employees in order to have the legality of a walkout
tested. Limiting the employer to this course of action not only
exposes him to an unfair labor practice charge with all its ramifica-
tions, but also subverts the goal of industrial peace and harmony.
HI. CONCLUSION
On its face, section 502 provides job security to employees who
refuse to work under abnormally dangerous conditions. It was, at
its inception, primarily a law for the economic protection of work-
ers. But relying upon section 502 is a cumbersome and sometimes
costly procedure. After a walkout has occurred, the employees in-
volved must prove the existence of an abnormally dangerous condi-
tion in order to be protected. Yet, common experience teaches that
it is better to remove oneself from a situation thought to be danger-
ous and be wrong, than to stay and discover the truth. Labor
groups can counteract the penalty for being wrong by insisting on
contract provisions that insure employees the right to temporarily
leave their stations when they believe themselves to be in danger,
This could be followed by bi-partisan determination of the actual-
ity of the danger with the right to arbitrate any disagreement
between the representatives of the bi-partisan committee.
These measures can only be successful if the federal courts
grant arbitration of safety matters the same status they have given
to arbitration in general. Until Gateway, there was no indication
the courts would not do so. 57 Ultimately, the decision as to whether
57The Third Circuit, which decided Gateway earlier decided Philadelphia Mar-
ine Trade Association v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 492 (3rd Cir. 1964), which indirectly
involved the arbitration of a section 502 dispute. The employer's defense to an
unfair labor practice allegation regarding a lockout was that it was only a tactic to
force the union to arbitrate the particular safety dispute. Although the court found
the employer to be the one actually preventing arbitration, it did not indicate that
his efforts would have been fruitless in any event.
Even now that Gateway is history, the Third Circuit is less than settled in its
policy for safety disputes. In United States Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers,
469 F.2d 729 (3rd Cir. 1972), the court again vacated an injunction awarded in
federal district court against employees who refused to work with a shift foreman
who allegedly failed to show proper concern for mine safety. A federal district judge
sitting with the court concurred because of the decision in Gateway. He indicated
that he would otherwise have dissented.
[Vol. 76
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section 502 disputes are to be settled at the local level by arbitra-
tors, before the NLRB, or in the courts will probably not affect the
lives or safety of workers. Self-preservation always prevails, and
workers will continue to walk off the job when they think they are
in danger. But the decision to remove oneself from a dangerous
situation is an intuitive reaction qualified by experience and obser-
vation, and the decision might be delayed if one realizes his liveli-
hood could be lost if a wrong decision is made. Therefore, maxi-
mum protection is provided for employees when they have clothed
themselves in contractual clauses that require speedy but knowl-
edgeable determination of their insistence that working conditions
are dangerous without any penalty for being wrong.
Bert Michael Whorton
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